BARELY a day after Davao City First District Representative Paolo “Pulong” Duterte filed complaints for libel and cyberlibel against National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Melvin Matibag, former police officer Rodulfo Gracioso Jr., GMA Network executives Felipe L. Gozon and Gilberto R. Duavit Jr., and journalists Mel Tiangco, Vicki Morales, Emil Sumangil, Darlene Cay, among others, another development involving a journalist made headlines.

On October 24, by virtue of a warrant issued by a Davao court, police authorities arrested veteran journalist Philip Lustre Jr. in Quezon City in connection with a cyberlibel case. Lustre, known for his body of work that criticizes the Duterte administration and its bloody war-on-drugs campaign, reportedly said he had no idea of the complaint filed against him.

Meanwhile, the complaints filed by Rep. Duterte stemmed from allegations regarding the supposed cash deliveries involving his family, which he denied and described as defamatory.

At the forefront of this controversy is the public discussion whether libel and cyberlibel should be decriminalized because this is a tactic being used by politicians to silence critics and journalists.

But what exactly constitutes libel? When does criticism become defamatory? Is factual reporting considered libel? Can a public official sue a journalist or an ordinary citizen for making unfavorable comments?

More importantly, does criticizing a public official automatically expose someone to criminal liability?

The answer requires an understanding of the Revised Penal Code, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, and several important decisions of the Supreme Court.

Libel as defined in the Revised Penal Code

In general, the import of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code states that libel is “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.”

Simply put, libel involves writing and publishing defamatory statements that damage another person’s reputation under circumstances punished by law.

Article 355 identifies the means by which libel may be committed, including writing, printing, and other similar means.

For instance, publishing an article in a newspaper falsely accusing a businessman of stealing company funds with the deliberate intention to destroy his reputation or distributing a written statement maliciously alleging that a school principal accepts bribes, without a factual basis, may constitute libel.

However, not every unpleasant, insulting, or critical statement is automatically libelous.

A long line of Supreme Court cases has consistently identified four essential elements of libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another, (b) publication of the imputation, (c) identity of the person defamed, and (d) existence of malice.

The first element is defamatory imputation, tending to dishonor, discredit, or bring another person into contempt. The second is the publication of the statement communicated to someone other than the person defamed. The third is identifiability—the offended person can be identified, even if not expressly named. The last element is malice in which the statement is made with the malice required by law.

To sustain conviction of the crime of libel, all of these elements must be proven.

What makes cyberlibel different?

The rapid emergence of digital platforms such as online news sites, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X, vlogs, and reels has changed the legal framework of the crime of libel. Now, defamatory statements are no longer confined to newspapers and printed publications.

Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, addresses this development. Section 4(c)(4) punishes libel “committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.” However, the Supreme Court in Disini v. Secretary of Justice explicitly mentioned that “cyber libel is not a new crime” because Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the RPC already punishes it.” The Court said that “a computer system as a means of publishing a defamatory material…[is] a qualifying circumstance.”

Thus, when the elements of libel are present and the defamatory material is published through a computer system, the offense may constitute cyberlibel.

For example, a Facebook user who maliciously publishes a defamatory accusation against an identifiable person may face a cyberlibel complaint. The same may apply to defamatory articles published on websites or other online platforms.

Note, however, that there is an important difference.

In Disini v. Secretary of Justice (2014), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of cyberlibel insofar as it applies to the original author of the defamatory online publication. The Court, however, struck down its application to persons who merely react to, receive, or share the material. In short, simply liking or reacting to a defamatory Facebook post does not automatically make someone criminally liable for cyberlibel.

The legal consequences may be different, however, when a person creates and publishes an independent defamatory statement.

Can public officials be criticized?

This gets us to possibly the most significant issue arising from recent complaints involving politicians and journalists.

Public officials are not immune from criticism. They serve at the pleasure of the sovereign people. And the sovereign people have every right to know information involving matters of public interest.

As a matter of fact, the High Court has repeatedly stressed that public officials must tolerate a greater degree of scrutiny concerning their official conduct.

In Borjal v. Court of Appeals (1999), the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of fair comment, which protects opinions and commentaries concerning matters of public interest when grounded on established facts. Speaking through Senior Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, the High Tribunal explains that “fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.”

In the old case of U.S. v. Bustos (1918), the Court explained that public officials cannot be excessively sensitive to criticism of their official acts because “the interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.”

It is also worth noting that “public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion.”

For example, a journalist who writes that a government infrastructure project appears overpriced, citing official documents and publicly available financial records, may be engaging in protected commentary on a matter of public interest. Similarly, an ordinary citizen who criticizes a mayor for allegedly inefficient disaster response, based on observable events and official reports, is not automatically committing libel.

The important distinction is between fair criticism grounded on facts and false defamatory allegations made with actual malice.

What is actual malice?

Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, defamatory imputations are generally presumed malicious, subject to recognized exceptions.

However, the Supreme Court has adopted a stricter standard when the complainant is a public official or public figure and the statements concern matters of public interest.

In Guingguing v. Court of Appeals (2005) and Daquer v. People (2021), the Court emphasized the requirement of actual malice. According to Guingguing case, “a public official may not successfully sue for libel unless the official can prove actual malice.” Actual malice means that the defamatory statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.” Guingguing case also reiterates that the “actual malice test” means that the speaker is protected against libel suits unless he knew that he was lying or he was truly foolish to think that he was telling the truth.

Importantly, actual malice is not simply anger, hostility, or personal dislike. Article 354 of the RPC “allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense “good intention and justifiable motive.” The exercise of free expression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on public affairs and public figures, certainly qualify as “justifiable motive,” if not “good intention.”

For example, a journalist may strongly dislike a politician and write a sharply critical article about the politician’s performance. That dislike alone does not establish actual malice. The prosecution must prove the required state of mind concerning the falsity of the defamatory statement.

In cases involving public officials or public figures, this heightened protection is essential to prevent criminal libel from becoming an instrument for silencing legitimate public criticism.

Do errors in news articles constitute actual malice?

The Court, citing American jurisprudence New York Times v. Sullivan, says that “even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.”

What defenses are available?

The law recognizes several defenses that may defeat a libel or cyberlibel charge.

First, fair comment on matters of public interest. Citizens and journalists may criticize official conduct, government policies, and public controversies, provided the commentary satisfies the requirements recognized by jurisprudence.

Second, privileged communications. Article 354 recognizes certain communications made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, as well as fair and true reports made in good faith of nonconfidential official proceedings, without comments or remarks. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press, which is classified as either absolute or qualified.

Absolutely privileged communications enjoy complete protection from liability, even when made with malice. For example, a senator or congressman cannot be held liable for statements made during speeches or debates in Congress or its committees. Conversely, qualifiedly privileged communications enjoy protection only when made in good faith and without actual malice. These include private complaints made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, fair and accurate reports of official proceedings, and fair commentaries on matters of public interest. For instance, a journalist who accurately reports allegations of corruption raised during a public Senate hearing may invoke this protection. However, such protection may be defeated if actual malice is proven. As emphasized by the Supreme Court in Borjal v. Court of Appeals, privileged communications are rooted in the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

Third, absence of actual malice. In cases where the constitutional actual-malice standard applies, the prosecution must establish that the statement was made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. “Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel.”

Fourth, absence of an essential element. If the statement is not defamatory, was not published to a third person, or does not identify the complainant, criminal libel cannot be established.

Fifth, prescription. A criminal complaint may be defeated when the offense has already prescribed under the applicable rules.

Truth may also be relevant, but it is important to understand that truth is not an automatic and unrestricted defense to every libel charge. Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code establishes specific rules concerning proof of truth and good motives or justifiable ends.

These defenses illustrate that the law does not punish every statement that embarrasses, offends, or displeases another person.

Reputation and freedom of speech, of expression, of the press

The law on libel seeks to protect reputation, honor, and dignity. But the Constitution also protects freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press under Article III, Section 4. These interests must be carefully balanced.

The late Chief Justice Ricardo M. Paras, Jr., in Quisumbing v. Lopez (1955), declared: “The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.”

Echoing the position of primacy of free speech, free expression, and free press, former Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, in his well-written introduction in Guingguing case, “the right of free expression stands as a hallmark of the modern democratic and humane state. Not only does it assure a person’s right to say freely what is thought freely, it likewise evinces the polity’s freedom from psychological insecurity.”

Journalists must be able to investigate wrongdoing. Citizens must be free to question public officials. Political leaders must remain open to criticism, even when that criticism is sharp, uncomfortable, or unfavorable.

At the same time, freedom of expression should not be used as a license to deliberately spread false defamatory accusations.

The recent complaints involving Congressman Duterte, GMA Network personnel, and journalist Philip Lustre Jr. remind us that criminal libel remains part of Philippine law.

Whether the allegations in these particular cases establish criminal liability is a matter for the proper prosecutorial and judicial proceedings.

But one principle must remain clear: Criticizing the government is not a crime simply because the government dislikes the criticism.

In a democracy, public officials are accountable to the people. And accountability necessarily includes the public’s freedom to question, scrutinize, investigate, and criticize those who exercise governmental power.

Yes, the law protects reputation, but the Constitution also protects the people’s right to speak truth to power.

Class dismissed!